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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review orders of 
the Industrial Commission (now the Utah Labor Commission) 
pursuant to former Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86 (1994) (repealed 
effective July 1, 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(6) 
(1997)).x 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission properly found that 
Petitioner Lori Warner (the "applicant") failed to establish 
that her employment legally caused her claimed back injuries 
pursuant to Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986) . 
This is a matter of application of law to a set of facts. 
The Industrial Commission's ruling is entitled to a strong 
presumption of correctness, and the ruling will be affirmed 
unless the applicant establishes that the Commission abused its 
discretion. Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 
1997) . 
xThe entire Utah Workers' Compensation Act was repealed and 
recodified effective July 1, 1997, and the Industrial Commission 
was replaced by the Labor Commission. This brief refers primarily 
to the Act as it was in effect on March 24, 1995, the date of the 
applicant's claimed injury. In addition, the brief refers to the 
"Industrial Commission," or simply the "Commission." 
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2. Whether the Industrial Commission properly found that 
Petitioner Lori Warner failed to establish that her employment 
"medically caused" her claimed injuries. 
This issue requires review of factual findings. These 
findings are entitled to great deference, and the court of 
appeals will reverse only if the petitioner establishes that 
the findings are not "supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1997). A person challenging 
factual findings must marshal all the evidence supporting the 
findings and then demonstrate that the findings are not 
justified by that evidence. VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n, 901 
P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16 (1994) 
(1) The commission has the duty and the full 
power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the 
facts and apply the law in this or any other title 
or chapter that it administers and to: 
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-45 (1994) 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee who 
is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-
inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss 
sustained on account of the injury or death, and 
such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services and medicines, and, in case of death, such 
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amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this 
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services 
and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under 
this chapter shall be on the employer and its 
insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-77 (1994) 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for 
compensation for injury by accident, or for death, 
arising out of and in the course of employment, and 
if the employer or its insurance carrier denies 
liability, the commission may refer the medical 
aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by 
the commission. 
(2) . . . . 
(d) The commission may base its finding 
and decision on the report of the panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants, but is not bound 
by the report if other substantial conflicting 
evidence in the case supports a contrary finding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1997) 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court 
or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review 
all final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has 
been substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: 
(d) The agency has erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law; 
(g) The agency action is based on a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion 
delegated to the agency by statute; 
• • • • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a Petition for Review of an Order by the Utah 
Industrial Commission holding that Respondents Merit Medical 
Systems, Inc., and TIG Insurance Co. are not liable to pay 
workers' compensation benefits to Petitioner Lori Warner for 
back problems that became symptomatic beginning in March 1995. 
Course of Proceedings 
Petitoner Lori Warner (the "applicant") instituted these 
proceedings before the Industrial Commission of Utah on June 
22, 1995, when she filed an Application for Hearing seeking 
workers' compensation benefits from her employer, Merit Medical 
Systems, Inc., and its insurer, TIG Insurance Co. (referred to 
collectively as "Merit Medical"), for injuries she allegedly 
sustained on March 24, 1995. R. 2. She filed an amended 
application for hearing on August 22, 1995. R. 31. Merit 
Medical denied liability on the ground that the applicant's 
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claimed injuries did not arise out of and in the course of her 
employment. R. 44-46. 
The matter went to a hearing in front of the Honorable 
Barbara A. Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge, on February 6, 
1996. Transcript, R. 73-187. After the hearing, Judge 
Elicerio referred the matter to a medical panel for an opinion 
on various issues, including whether the applicant's back 
problems were causally related to her employment with Merit 
Medical. R. 189-200. The medical panel issued a report, which 
was received by Judge Elicerio on July 11, 1996, finding only 
a "limited" causal connection between the applicant's 
employment and her back complaints. R. 412-19. Judge Elicerio 
then issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order 
holding Merit Medical liable to pay compensation and benefits 
for the applicant's claimed injury. ALJ Findings, R. 425-39 
(Addendum Exhibit 2). 
Merit Medical filed a Motion for Review with the Indus-
trial Commission on October 11, 1996. R. 440-47. On March 17, 
1997, the Commission entered a new Order, granting the Motion 
for Review. Commission Order, R. 453-61 (Addendum Exhibit 1). 
The Commission found that the applicant failed to establish 
that her back condition was either legally or medically caused 
by her employment with Merit Medical. On April 7, 1997, the 
applicant filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Commis-
sion, R. 462-65, which was denied in an Order dated May 2, 
1997. Addendum Exhibit 3. The applicant filed a Petition for 
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Review on May 30, 1997, R. 474, and a Docketing Statement on 
June 23, 1997. R. 482-519. 
Statement of Facts 
Merit Medical Systems manufactures plastic parts for 
medical devices. Commission Order, R. 453 (Addendum Exhibit 
1). These parts are made by large machines, which drop the 
completed parts into small plastic bins or "totes" approxi-
mately two-and-a-half feet long, eighteen inches wide, and only 
eighteen inches deep. R. 453-54. A molding operator then 
removes the bins from the machines and carries them to a nearby 
table where the bins are emptied into larger containers. R. 
454. Periodically, the bins are taken to a scale for weighing, 
or taken to a table for measuring. R. 454. These bins are 
lifted approximately nine times per hour, but they weigh only 
five to twenty pounds on average, with an occasional bin 
weighing up to twenty-six pounds.2 ALJ Findings, R. 432 
(Addendum Exhibit 2). Molding operators also vacuum and clean 
around their machines at the end of their shifts. R. 429. 
Applicant Lori Warner began working as a molding operator 
for Merit Medical in January 1995. Commission Order, R. 453. 
She worked a basic forty-hour week without difficulty, and she 
2The applicant appears to claim that the bins averaged twenty-
six pounds. Petitioner's Brief at 9. However, the ALJ and the 
Commission made specific findings, as set forth in the text, and 
these findings must be accepted as conclusive unless the applicant 
marshals all the evidence supporting them. E.g.. Featherstone v. 
Indust. Comm'n, 877 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). At any 
rate, the Commission's finding in this respect is supported by the 
evidence. See, e.g., R. 141:1-11. 
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never felt any back pain, soreness, or stiffness while she 
worked for Merit. Transcript, R. 113:17-21, 114:5-11, 116:12-
14, 123:22-25. But when the applicant was at home on March 24, 
1995, she felt a pain in her back. R. 113:17-21. She had not 
worked that day, as it was her scheduled day off. R. 116:15-
17. In fact, she did not work a full shift on the previous 
day, either. The machines had been down, making her job even 
easier than usual, R. 113:22 - 114:3, 123:6-8, and things were 
so slow that the applicant's boss let her go home early because 
she complained of a headache. R. 103:16 - 104:2. 
As later revealed by the medical evidence, the applicant 
was suffering from long-standing degenerative disc disease at 
the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels of her lumbar spine, along with facet 
arthritis. CT Scan Report, R. 409-10, Medical Panel Report, R. 
417. In addition, she had previously injured her back in 1986, 
at which time she was diagnosed with a "twisting injury" and 
"severe" acute low back strain, with pain focused on the L4-5 
and L5-S1 levels. R. 311. 
The applicant went to Instacare on March 24, 1995. She 
reported back pain, but she did not attribute this pain to 
anything that happened at her job. R. 246. She was prescribed 
muscle relaxants, but her pain evidently did not clear up. She 
called in sick on March 26, but once again she did not even 
suggest that her back pain was caused by anything that happened 
at work. R. 146:24 - 147:2. In fact, she never reported any 
work-related back problems until three weeks after she first 
sought treatment, on April 14. R. 146:13-17. And even then, 
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she never reported any specific incident at work that caused 
her even the slightest back pain. R. 147:11-18. 
On March 28, a CT scan was performed on the applicant's 
lumbar spine. At L4-5, the scan revealed degenerative changes, 
a broad based Grade I (minor) disc bulge, and what appeared to 
be an old apophyseal avulsion. R. 409. The CT scan also 
revealed a "vague increased soft tissue density" that suggested 
a possible extruded fragment, but this could not be confirmed. 
Id. At L5-S1, the CT scan uncovered even more significant 
degenerative changes, including facet arthritis and an 
irregularity of the posterior ring apophysis that possibly 
indicated an old disc herniation. Id* No significant neural 
compromise was noted. Id. 
The applicant underwent an L5-S1 discectomy in June 1995. 
Commission Order, R. 454, and evidently returned to work three 
months later. R. 109:12-14. She apparently was off work again 
for a while after that, but by the February 1996 hearing, she 
was working full time for a different employer. R. 110:8-15. 
In January 1996, her treating physician rated her as having 
only a five percent permanent partial impairment. R. 381. 
In late January 1996, the applicant was seen by Dr. Gerald 
Moress and Dr. Wallace Hess at the request of Merit Medical. 
R. 399. Drs. Moress and Hess carefully reviewed the appli-
cant's medical records and performed a thorough examination. 
Drs. Moress and Hess performed the standard credibility tests 
on the applicant, and her responses were "inappropriate" on 
five of the seven categories. R. 405. These doctors assessed 
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the applicant as suffering from a "pain disorder characterized 
by psychological factors and general medical condition." R. 
406. 
Drs. Moress and Hess concluded that there was no causal 
connection between the applicant's employment and her claimed 
back problems. They found it significant that "there was no 
incident at work that could be identified." R. 406. They 
further noted that the CT scan revealed only a small disc bulge 
at L4-5, and possibly at L5-S1, but that it also showed a 
"fracture of the apophyseal ring which had nothing to do with 
the industrial accident and is developmental in origin." Id. 
The doctors therefore concluded that none of the applicant's 
impairment, disability, or medical care was attributable to the 
claimed industrial accident. R. 407. 
The matter went to a hearing in February 1996. Merit 
Medical denied liability on the ground that the applicant's job 
was neither the legal cause nor the medical cause of her 
injury, pursuant to Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986). After the hearing, the administrative law judge 
referred the matter to a medical panel for an opinion regarding 
medical causation and other issues. R. 189-200. The medical 
panel noted that the CT scan had revealed degenerative changes 
in the applicant's lumbar spine and that subsequent studies 
confirmed narrowing at the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels, along with 
spurring and scoliosis. R. 417. The panel's report was 
unclear, but it ultimately concluded that there was only a 
"limited" causal connection between the applicant's work 
-9-
exposure and her subsequent back problems. R. 417. The panel 
also concluded that the industrial exposure aggravated a 
preexisting condition, but it clarified that there had been 
only a "temporary aggravation related to her work." R. 418. 
The panel therefore attributed only one percent of her 
impairment to her work. Id. The panel also opined that the 
applicant's surgery was necessitated by the work exposure only 
"to a limited extent." Id. The panel then cautioned that "it 
is quite possible that the surgery may not have been needed at 
that time had there been more concern for the functional aspect 
of her reaction to her total circumstances." Id. 
After receiving the medical panel report, Judge Elicerio 
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order. R. 
425-39 (Addendum Exhibit 2) . She interpreted the medical panel 
report as finding that the work for Merit Medical was a medical 
cause of the applicant's back condition, and she adopted this 
finding as her own. R. 434-35. She also found that legal 
causation was barely satisfied, concluding that the applicant's 
job, which required her to lift the five-to-twenty-pound bins 
approximately nine times per hour, was "slightly" more exertive 
than what the average person does in his or her everyday 
nonemployment life. R. 435-36. 
The Commission overruled the ALJ on both grounds. R. 453-
61. The Commission reviewed the medical reports and concluded 
that the applicant had not established a medical link between 
her employment and her injuries. The Commission carefully 
considered the medical panel report, a report by the 
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applicant's treating physician, and the report provided by Drs. 
Moress and Hess, and it concluded that the Moress/Hess report 
was the most persuasive medical evidence. R. 457-58. The 
Commission reasoned as follows: 
The Industrial Commission finds the medical panel's 
report somewhat unpersuasive because of its 
ambiguous and equivocating answers. In contrast, 
the report of Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess is well 
reasoned and consistent with the circumstances under 
which Ms. Warner began to experience low back pain. 
The Industrial Commission therefore accepts the 
opinion of Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess that there is no 
medical causal connection between Ms. Warner's work 
at Merit and her low back injury. 
R. 458 (emphasis added). 
The Industrial Commission also found that the applicant 
had failed to establish that her job was a legal cause of her 
back injuries, because her job did not require an "unusual 
exertion," as required by Allen. R. 456-57. The Commission 
"carefully considered the demands of Ms. Warner's work at 
Merit, as well as the manner in which Ms. Warner performed 
those duties," and concluded that her work exertions were not 
unusual or extraordinary. R. 456. The Commission concluded, 
The Industrial Commission recognizes that Ms. 
Warner's work required her to carry as many as 9 
bins an hour, but the bins were not heavy and 
usually were not carried very far. When the full 
range of all non-employment activities are 
considered, even the frequency of Ms. Warner's 
lifting and carrying at work is not unusual or 
extraordinary. The Industrial Commission therefore 
finds that Ms. Warner's work at Merit is not the 
legal cause of her injury. 
R. 457. 
This appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Applicant Lori Warner seeks to require Merit Medical to 
pay compensation and medical expenses even though there is no 
real connection between her employment with Merit Medical and 
the back problems that became symptomatic in March 1995. The 
Industrial Commission carefully considered the applicant's 
evidence and held that she had failed to demonstrate that her 
employment was either a medical cause or a legal cause of her 
back problems. Both of these determinations are entitled to 
deference on appeal, and the applicant has not established that 
they are erroneous. 
Under Allen v. Industrial Commission, an employee must 
establish both legal causation and medical causation in order 
to recover workers' compensation benefits. To establish legal 
causation, an employee with a preexisting condition must 
demonstrate that his or her employment imposed an "unusual or 
extraordinary exertion" that contributed to the injury. To 
show medical causation, the employee must show that the work-
related exertion actually physically caused his or her injury. 
If the employee fails to meet either element, compensation must 
be denied. 
The Commission did not err in concluding that the appli-
cant failed to establish legal causation. This conclusion is 
entitled to deference under UAPA and under Drake v. Industrial 
Commission, a recent Utah Supreme Court case holding that an 
administrative agency's application of a highly fact-sensitive 
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legal standard is entitled to a "strong presumption" of 
correctness. 
In Drake, the supreme court held that the determination as 
to whether an employee was on a "special errand" was entitled 
to heightened deference because the question was highly fact-
specific and did not readily yield uniform rules. And the 
issue in our case, whether the applicant's employment consti-
tuted an unusual exertion, is even more fact-specific than the 
issue involved in Drake. In addition, the Commission has 
experience and expertise in applying the unusual exertion test 
because it specializes in workers' compensation cases and deals 
with this issue all the time. Therefore, under the principles 
set forth in Drake, the Commission's determination that the 
applicant failed to establish legal causation is also entitled 
to deference. 
The Commission's determination regarding legal causation 
should be upheld by the court. The evidence presented before 
the Commission shows that the applicant's job did not involve 
an unusual or extraordinary exertion: she simply had to lift 
small plastic bins containing plastic parts. She had to lift 
these with some frequency, but the bins were light and she did 
not have to carry them very far. The exertions involved in the 
applicant's work are certainly comparable to those involved in 
many everyday activities. Therefore, the Commission did not 
abuse its wide discretion in finding that legal causation was 
not shown. 
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Because the applicant failed to establish legal causation, 
the denial of benefits should be affirmed. But the Commission 
also did not err in finding that the applicant had failed to 
establish medical causation. This is a question of fact, and 
the court of appeals must affirm if the Commission's finding is 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. In our case, 
the Commission relied on the persuasive medical report prepared 
by Dr. Gerald Moress and Dr. Wallace Hess, who examined the 
applicant on behalf of Merit Medical. A medical panel had 
issued a confusing report that appeared to contradict the 
report of Drs. Moress and Hess, but the Commission carefully 
considered both reports and found the Moress/Hess report to be 
more persuasive. Under the plain language of the governing 
statute, the Commission is free to consider evidence that 
contradicts a medical panel report, and the Commission is not 
bound by a medical panel report if "other substantial 
conflicting evidence" supports a contrary finding. In 
addition, the Commission's finding was certainly supported by 
substantial evidence. Therefore, the finding that there was no 
medical causation should also be upheld on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, an employer is 
liable to pay compensation and medical expenses only if the 
employee establishes an injury "by accident arising out of and 
in the course of his employment." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 
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(1994) (recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(l) (1997)). 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court explained that compensation is to be awarded 
"only where there is a sufficient causal connection between the 
disability and the working conditions." Id. at 24-25. The 
Allen court adopted a two-part test to determine causation: 
the employee must prove that his or her employment was both the 
"legal cause" and the "medical cause" of the injury. Id. at 
25-27. If the employee fails to prove either of these 
elements, he or she is not entitled to compensation. E.g. , 
Helf v. Indus. Comm'n, 901 P.2d 1024, 1027 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) . 
In our case, the Industrial Commission determined that the 
applicant had failed to satisfy either prong of the Allen 
test.3 Therefore, the Commission concluded that the applicant 
had not established that her injury "arose out of and in the 
course of" her employment with Merit Medical. For this court 
to reverse, it must find that the Commission erred in both 
determinations. However, on appeal, the applicant has failed 
to demonstrate that either of the Commission's rulings was 
erroneous. The finding that the applicant did not establish 
legal causation is within the Commission's discretion, and the 
finding that she did not establish medical causation is 
3The Commission, and not the administrative law judge, is the 
ultimate finder of fact in workers' compensation cases, and it is 
the Commission's decision that must be reviewed by the court of 
appeals. E.g., Virgin v. Board of Revie /, 803 P.2d 1284, 1289 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Commission's 
order denying compensation should be affirmed. 
I. THE COMMISSION PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE APPLICANT 
FAILED TO PROVE THAT HER EMPLOYMENT LEGALLY CAUSED HER 
BACK CONDITION. 
Under Allen, when an employee has a preexisting condition, 
an aggravation of that condition is not compensable unless the 
employee establishes that the aggravation resulted from a work-
related "unusual or extraordinary exertion." Id. at 26. If 
the employee fails to meet this burden, then legal causation is 
not met, and the claim must be denied. The applicant in our 
case suffered from preexisting degenerative disc disease, so 
she was required to meet the "unusual exertion" standard.4 
However, the Commission found that the applicant's work-related 
exertions were neither unusual nor extraordinary: she was 
required simply to lift small plastic bins containing plastic 
parts. This finding is entitled to a great deal of deference 
under Utah case law. 
A. The Industrial Commission's determination is 
entitled to deference. 
Under the Utah Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), a 
reviewing court may reverse agency action if the agency has 
"erroneously interpreted or applied the law." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1997). However, in determining whether an 
4The applicant has not challenged this finding on appeal. 
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agency's application of the law to the facts was "erroneous," 
the appellate court will review the agency's ruling with some 
measure of deference, depending on the nature of the legal 
standard being applied. Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 
181-82 (Utah 1997). As noted above, to establish that her 
claimed injuries were legally caused by her employment, the 
applicant was required to show that her injuries arose from an 
"unusual or extraordinary exertion." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. 
The determination as to whether this standard was met is highly 
fact-dependent, does not readily yield uniform rules, and is 
one which an appellate court could not profitably review de 
novo in every instance. Therefore, the standard of review of 
the Commission's determination on this issue is one of 
heightened deference. 
The reasoning employed by the Utah Supreme Court in Drake 
represented a major departure from the analytical model pre-
viously used in determining the standard of review of agency 
actions. Drake did not mention UAPA, nor did it discuss any of 
the important cases interpreting UAPA. Therefore, to fully 
understand Drake's effect on the standard of review analysis 
under UAPA, a little history is in order. 
1. Pre-UAPA: The determination as to whether an 
employee has established an unusual exertion is 
entitled to intermediate deference. 
Before the enactment of UAPA, appellate courts generally 
reviewed agency determinations under three standards of review. 
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Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991); 
see also Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 658 
P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983). Questions of "general law" were 
reviewed nondeferentially, using a correction-of-error stan-
dard. Morton, 814 P. 2d at 585. Findings of fact, on the other 
hand, were reviewed with great deference: appellate courts 
upheld such findings if they were supported by "evidence of any 
substance." See Admin. Servs., 658 P. 2d at 608-09. But "mixed 
questions of law and fact," or questions involving the applica-
tion of law to basic facts, were generally reviewed under an 
intermediate standard, and agency decisions on those questions 
were upheld if they were "reasonable or rational." This inter-
mediate standard applied unless the court was in as good a 
position as the agency to make the determination, considering 
factors such as the agency's expertise and experience in the 
area. Id. at 610; Morton, 814 P.2d at 585-87. 
Under these principles, Industrial Commission applications 
of the Allen "unusual exertion" test were reviewed using a 
bifurcated standard. The Commission's determination as to the 
precise requirements of an employee's job, an issue of fact, 
was reviewed with great deference. However, the determination 
whether the employee's job-related activities amounted to an 
unusual exertion was a "mixed question," Price River Coal Co. 
v. Indus. Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Utah 1986), and was 
reviewed under the intermediate standard: the Commission's 
determination as to whether the "unusual exertion" standard was 
met would stand unless the court found that the decision was 
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not "'within the limits of reasonableness and rationality."1 
Sisco Hilte v. Indus. Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (quoting Admin. Servs., 658 P.2d at 610); accord 
Stouffer Foods v. Indus. Comm'n, 801 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); Nyrehn v. Indus. Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330, 333 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Smith & Edwards v. Indus. Comm'n, 770 P.2d 
1016, 1017-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
2. UAPA: The Commission has discretion to apply 
the Workers' Compensation Act in cases before 
it, and its determinations are to be upheld 
unless they are unreasonable. 
UAPA changed the way appellate courts approached 
Industrial Commission rulings under the Workers' Compensation 
Act. Under UAPA, an appellate court may reverse agency action 
if the agency "erroneously interpreted or applied the law." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1997). In Morton Interna-
tional, the supreme court declared that this new statute 
generally imposed a correction-of-error standard in reviewing 
an agency's interpretation or application of a statutory term. 
814 P.2d at 587-88. However, if the agency was granted some 
discretion to interpret or apply the statute, then the agency 
action would be reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard 
provided in subsection 16(4)(h)(i), which states that a court 
may reverse if the agency action is "an abuse of the discretion 
delegated to the agency by statute." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(i) (1997). Thus, in determining how much deference to 
afford agency action, the key was no longer simply the agency's 
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expertise and experience; instead, the focus was on whether the 
agency had been granted any discretion, implicitly or explicit-
ly, by the statute. Morton, 814 P.2d at 588. 
UAPA, and the explanation given it in Morton, proved to be 
difficult to apply, and the post-UAPA cases reviewing Indus-
trial Commission actions under the Workers' Compensation Act 
have not yielded consistent results. For example, some cases 
have concluded that the court of appeals should review 
Industrial Commission rulings under a strict correction-of-
error standard. See, e.g., Cross v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 
1202, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); King v. Indus. Comm'n, 850 
P.2d 1281, 1291-92 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). These cases generally 
looked at the language of section 35-1-45 and simply concluded 
that the statute did not contain a grant of discretion. Cross, 
824 P.2d at 1204; King, 850 P.2d at 1291-92. It appears that 
most of the subsequent cases addressing the standard of review 
under the Workers' Compensation Act have relied on Cross and 
King, or their progeny.5 
A significant new case, however, has drawn a distinction 
between review of the Commission's interpretation of the 
Workers' Compensation Act and review of the Commission's 
application of the Act to specific factual situations. Caporoz 
v. Indus. Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). See 
5E.g., Walls v. Indus. Comm'n, 857 P.2d 964, 966-67 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (citing Cross and King); Crapo v. Indus. Comm'n, 922 
P.2d 39, 41 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (Cross and King); Buczvnski v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Walls and 
Cross) . 
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also VanLeeuwen v. Indus, Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995); Employers' Reinsurance Fund v. Indus. Comm'n, 856 
P.2d 648, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Billings, P.J., concurring 
in the result, joined by Russon, J.). In Caporoz, the most 
recent pronouncement on the issue, the court recognized that 
former section 35-1-16 of the Act grants the Commission "the 
duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to 
determine the facts and apply the law." Therefore, Commission 
applications of the Act should be reviewed under the more 
deferential "reasonableness" standard. Caporoz, 945 P.2d at 
143; see Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16(1) (1994) (recodified at Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997)). 
Caporoz is more consistent with UAPA's legislative 
history. As noted in Savage Industries v. Tax Commission, 811 
P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah 1991), the UAPA standards of review are 
based on section 5-116 of the Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act. Subsection 16(4)(d) of UAPA is identical to 
subsection 5-116(c)(4) of the Model Act. The commentators to 
the Model Act noted that the standards set forth in that 
provision "reflect the well-accepted principle that the role of 
the reviewing court is, in general, a limited one." Model 
State Admin. Proc. Act § 5-116 comment, 15 U.L.A. 128 (1990) 
(emphasis added) (Addendum Exhibit 4). And, addressing the 
specific provision at issue in our case, the commentators 
specifically explained that agency applications of law are to 
be reviewed under a more deferential standard than are agency 
interpretations of the law: 
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Paragraph (c)(4) includes two distinct matters 
— interpretation and application of the law. With 
regard to the agency's interpretation of the law, 
courts generally give little deference to the 
agency, with the result that a court may decide that 
the agency has erroneously interpreted the law if 
the court merely disagrees with the agency's 
interpretation. By contrast, with regard to the 
agency's application of the law to specific 
situations, the enabling statute normally confers 
some discretion upon the agency. Accordingly, a 
court should find reversible error in the agency's 
application of the law only if the agency has 
improperly exercised its discretion . . . . 
Id. (italics in original, bold print added). 
While statutory interpretation and application are related 
concepts, there are definite differences between the two. For 
example, when an issue requires the consideration of only a few 
simple, undisputed, basic facts, the matter can be seen as one 
of statutory interpretation. In these cases, the court can 
issue a general rule that will uniformly govern all future 
situations of a similar nature. Thus, in these "interpreta-
tion" cases, review is proper under the less deferential 
correction-of-error standard. 
But where the issue is whether an established legal stan-
dard is satisfied, and if the facts are disputed or highly 
involved, or if the standard itself is nebulous (e.g., whether 
an action is "reasonable"), then the question is primarily one 
of "application." And, as recognized in Caporoz, the Commis-
sion has been granted the discretion to apply the Workers' 
Compensation Act, so its applications must be reviewed with 
deference. 
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Both King and Cross were "interpretation" cases. In King 
the issue was whether an employee's incarceration after an in-
dustrial accident affected his or her entitlement to temporary 
total disability. 850 P.2d at 1292. In Cross, the issue was 
whether an employee is entitled to benefits when driving home 
from work. 824 P.2d at 1204. In both of these cases, the 
facts were undisputed and straightforward, and in each case the 
court's holding effectively created a uniform rule applicable 
to all future cases. Caporoz, however, was an "application" 
case: the issue was whether a decedent's two sisters qualified 
as "dependents" under the Act and were thus entitled to death 
benefits. 945 P.2d at 142-43. In that case, the facts were 
highly detailed, and the standard being applied was very fact-
specific. The holding in that case, that those particular 
sisters were not dependents, is not a generally applicable 
"rule." 
3. Drake v. Industrial Commission: Where the 
legal standard being applied grants the agency 
discretion in its operation, the agency's 
determination will be accorded a strong 
presumption of correctness. 
The Utah Supreme Court employed a new method of analysis 
in Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
In Drake, the employee was injured in an automobile accident 
while driving home after work. 939 P.2d at 179. She lived in 
Ogden, but she normally worked at her employer's Salt Lake City 
office. About two or three days per week, however, she 
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delivered documents to her employer's Ogden office at the end 
of the day, before going home. The route from the Salt Lake 
City office to her home via the Ogden office was about five or 
six miles farther than a route from the Salt Lake office 
directly home. She did this regularly for months. The 
accident took place after she left the Ogden office on her way 
home. Id. 
The Industrial Commission denied the employee's claim for 
workers' compensation benefits under the "coming and going" 
rule, which provides that an employee is not in the course of 
her employment when she is going to or coming home from work. 
Id. at 180. The employee claimed that she was acting in the 
course of her employment under the "special errand" exception 
to the rule, but the Commission found that, because the deli-
veries to the Ogden office were part of the employee's regular 
duties, she was not on a special errand. Instead, her work day 
simply ended when she left the Ogden office, and she was not in 
the course of her employment while simply on her way home when 
the accident took place. 
The court of appeals reversed. Drake, 904 P.2d 203 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). The court first held that the Commission did 
not have any discretion to interpret the Workers' Compensation 
Act, so the Commission's denial of benefits would be reviewed 
"for correctness." Id. at 205. The court then engaged in an 
independent application of the special errand doctrine to the 
facts and concluded that the delivery of the documents to the 
-24-
Ogden office was in fact a special errand, outside the 
employee's regular duties. Id. at 206-07. 
The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the 
court of appeals, holding that a more deferential standard of 
review was required. 939 P.2d at 184. In doing so, the 
supreme court did not apply the standard UAPA "discretion 
granted by statute" analysis (in fact, except for one brief 
"see also" citation, UAPA was not even mentioned) . The supreme 
court instead adopted the standard of review analysis used in 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 934-39 (Utah 1994), a criminal 
case. In Pena, the issue was whether the trial court had erred 
in finding that an investigatory stop was supported by 
reasonable suspicion. 869 P. 2d at 934. Addressing the 
standard of review, the supreme court held in that case that 
whether a set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a 
question of law, but the trial court's legal conclusion would 
be reviewed with some deference, because the legal standard 
itself conveys a measure of discretion to a trial court in its 
operation. Id. at 939. 
The supreme court applied this analysis in Drake. The 
court explained that, in determining the proper standard of 
review, the first step is to decide whether the issue being 
reviewed is a question of fact, a question of law, or a "mixed 
question requiring application of the law to the facts." 939 
P.2d at 181. The court further explained that, with regard to 
mixed questions, a bifurcated standard would be used. Id. 
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Under this bifurcated standard, findings as to the 
underlying empirical facts are reviewed under the deferential 
"substantial evidence" standard for factual findings. Id. But 
the agency's conclusion as to whether those facts satisfy a 
legal standard is not necessarily reviewed under the strict 
correction-of-error standard, even though the legal effect of 
a given set of facts is a question of law. Rather, an agency's 
application of the law is to be reviewed with "varying degrees 
of strictness," from the strict correction-of-error standard to 
a broad "abuse of discretion" standard. Id. The precise level 
of deference to be granted depends on whether, based on "policy 
considerations and other factors," the legal standard itself 
"'actually grants some operational discretion to the trial 
courts applying it.'" Id. (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36). 
The court held that the Commission's conclusion that the 
employee was not on a "special errand" was entitled to defer-
ence. The court noted that the special errand doctrine was 
highly fact-intensive. Id. As a result, it was unlikely that 
an objective "rule" could be formulated that would apply to all 
"special errand" cases. Id. The court explained, "Thus, this 
is a question that 'we cannot profitably review de novo in 
every case because we cannot hope to work out a coherent 
statement of the law through a course of such decisions.'" Id. 
(quoting Pena at 938). The court concluded, "Given the nature 
of the legal issue, we conclude that the legal standard is one 
that 'conveys a measure of discretion to [the Commission] when 
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applying that standard to a given set of facts.'" Id. (quoting 
Pena at 939). 
Addressing the merits, the court noted that the Commission 
had found that the deliveries were part of the employee's 
regular duties. The court reasoned, "Under the standard 
enunciated above, we defer to the Commission's decision and 
accord a strong presumption that the deliveries were not 
'special.'" Id. at 184 (emphasis added). The court thus 
upheld the Commission's denial of benefits. 
While Drake ignored UAPA, it actually appears to have 
adopted the "interpretation" vs. "application" analysis 
discussed previously. Under Drake, if the legal question is 
highly fact-intensive, or if the legal standard itself requires 
the use of judgment in its operation, then the legal standard 
grants discretion to the agency, and the agency's decision will 
be afforded a "strong presumption" of correctness. But under 
the interpretation-application analysis, such a situation would 
be considered one requiring "application" of the law, and the 
determination would be reviewed with deference under Caporoz. 
On the other hand, if the facts are simple and the legal 
standard is straightforward, or if the court's ruling could be 
used as a uniform "rule," then the appellate court will review 
the agency on a stricter correction-of-error standard, under 
either Drake or cases such as Cross and King. 
Drake also revived elements of the pre-UAPA analysis. For 
a key aspect of the Pena-Drake analysis is that the standard of 
review depends on whether the agency or the appellate court is 
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in the better position to determine whether a legal standard is 
satisfied. And one of the "policy considerations and other 
factors" that must be weighed would be the agency's experience 
and expertise in the subject matter. Thus, under Drake, where 
there is a mixed question of law and fact, and where the agency 
has the expertise and experience, the agency's actions would 
once again be reviewed under an intermediate standard of 
review. 
4. Under UAPA and Drake, the Commission's deter-
mination as to whether an employee established 
an unusual exertion is reviewed with heightened 
deference. 
Applying these considerations to our case, it is easy to 
see that the Commission's determination as to whether an unu-
sual exertion was established must be reviewed with heightened 
deference. For whether someone's job-related exertions are 
"unusual" is even more fact-intensive than the question of 
whether an errand is "special." The Allen test requires 
consideration of a wide variety of factors, and each case must 
be judged based on its own unique set of facts. See, e.g. . 
Smith & Edwards, 770 P.2d at 1018 (noting that the determina-
tion requires consideration of several factors). Further, 
because each case is unique, it is quite doubtful that any 
uniform rules or principles "can be formulated that will 
adequately address all potential facts in these cases." Drake, 
939 P.2d at 182. Thus, a court cannot profitably review each 
"unusual exertion" case de novo. Id. 
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In addition, the Commission has experience and expertise 
in applying the Allen standard. The Commission specializes in 
workers' compensation cases, and it applies the unusual 
exertion test all the time. The Commission is thus in the best 
position to consider all the variables that arise in these 
cases and to get a sense of what exertions are unusual and what 
exertions are not. See, e.g., Smith & Edwards v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 770 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (intermediate 
standard is appropriate for unusual exertion test because court 
relies "'heavily upon the Commission's expertise and 
familiarity with the work environment.'") 
The argument for deference is even stronger in our case 
than it was in Drake. In Drake there were really only a few 
key facts: the employee made her deliveries two to three times 
per week, she had been doing so for months, it was expected 
that she would keep making these deliveries in the future, and 
the deliveries required a five or six mile detour. These facts 
were undisputed, and they are much more discrete and definite 
than the factors involved in the application of the unusual 
exertion test. The concerns expressed in Drake thus apply with 
even greater force in our situation. 
B. The Industrial Commission did not err in determining 
that the applicant's employment did not involve an 
unusual exertion. 
The applicant had preexisting back injuries, so, under 
Allen, she must demonstrate that her injury resulted from a 
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work-related unusual or extraordinary exertion in order to 
establish legal causation. The Industrial Commission carefully 
considered the evidence regarding the demands of the appli-
cant's job, and it unanimously concluded that the minor 
physical requirements of her job did not constitute an unusual 
or extraordinary exertion.6 Under UAPA and Drake, this deci-
sion is afforded a strong presumption of correctness, and the 
applicant has not overcome this presumption. 
Most significantly, the applicant's job did not require 
any heavy lifting. The applicant simply had to lift small 
plastic bins containing light plastic parts. Commission Order, 
R. 453-54 (Addendum Exhibit 1). These bins were only about 
two-and-a-half feet long by one-and-a-half feet wide, and only 
eighteen inches deep. Id. The most these bins ever weighed, 
even when full, was twenty-six pounds, and they rarely weighed 
even that much: they generally weighed no more than twenty 
pounds, and they often weighed as little as five pounds. ALJ 
Findings, R. 432 (Addendum Exhibit 2), Commission Order, R. 
454. This is certainly not an unusual exertion when compared 
to typical nonemployment activities. 
The court in Allen set forth specific examples of 
activities that would be considered "typical nonemployment 
activities." These included taking full garbage cans to the 
Commissioner Carlson purported to "dissent" from the 
Commission's ruling, but he objected only to the finding of medical 
causation. He did not disagree with the Commmission's conclusion 
that the applicant had failed to establish legal causation. 
Therefore, Commissioner Carlson's opinion should be deemed a 
"concurrence in the result." 
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street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a 
flat tire on an automobile, and lifting a small child to chest 
height. Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. Each of these activities 
involves far greater physical strain than does lifting the 
plastic bins involved in our case. See, e.g.. Smith & Edwards 
v. Indus. Comm'n, 770 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(lift of 47.5 pounds was not an unusual exertion). 
That the applicant lifted these plastic bins nine times 
per hour does not make her job particularly demanding. First, 
while lifting "nine times an hour" may sound like a lot in the 
abstract, it means that the applicant would still have, on 
average, more than six full minutes between lifts. Second, and 
more importantly, the bins were light. The applicant's job 
allowed her to lift a light bin, do something else for six 
minutes, and then lift another one. These exertions are less 
stressful than those required in many everyday activities, such 
as cleaning house, performing yard work, doing laundry, or 
chasing after small children. 
The Commission specifically considered and rejected the 
applicant's argument that her job required an unusual exertion 
due to the frequency of the lifting. The Commission reasoned, 
The Industrial Commission recognizes that Ms. 
Warner's work required her to carry as many as 9 
bins an hour, but the bins were not heavy and 
usually were not carried very far. When the full 
range of all non-employment activities are [sic] 
considered, even the frequency of Ms. Warner's 
lifting and carrying at work is not unusual or 
extraordinary. 
Commission Order, R. 457 (emphasis added). 
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Our case is easily distinguishable from Nvrehn v. Indus-
trial Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), because 
the strain caused by the employment in Nyrehn was much greater 
than any strain involved in our case. In Nyrehn, the employee 
was required to lift tubs regularly weighing up to forty 
pounds. Id. at 331. As set forth above, in our case the bins 
weighed a maximum of twenty-six pounds, and even that was rare; 
most of the time they were between five and twenty pounds. ALJ 
Findings, R. 432. Common experience shows that a forty-pound 
lift causes a much greater strain than a five-to-twenty-pound 
lift, and it is much easier to make several easy lifts than to 
make one forty-pound lift. Moreover, an additional factor in 
Nvrehn was that the employee was required to engage in 
"constant bending and stooping" to sort merchandise into 
different tubs. Nyrehn, 800 P. 2d at 331. There are no 
comparable factual findings in our case. 
As established by Drake, the Commission's determination 
that the unusual exertion standard was not met is entitled to 
a "strong presumption" of correctness. Drake, 939 P.2d at 184. 
The Commission carefully considered the requirements of the 
applicant's job and concluded that, when everything was taken 
into account, the applicant's job simply did not require any 
unusual exertion. The applicant has not presented anything to 
overcome this presumption. The only authority she relies on, 
Nvrehn, is distinguishable, and she has not cited any other 
authority to suggest that lifting between five and twenty-six 
pounds is an unusual exertion, even if done nine times in an 
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hour. The applicant has failed to establish that her back 
condition was legally caused by her employment, and as such the 
Commission's denial of benefits should be affirmed. 
II. THE COMMISSION PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE APPLICANT 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HER BACK CONDITION WAS MEDICALLY 
CAUSED BY HER EMPLOYMENT. 
Because the applicant failed to prove legal causation, 
Merit Medical is not required to pay benefits, and the 
Commission's Order can be affirmed. Thus, the court need not 
address medical causation. However, if the court finds that 
the Commission abused its wide discretion in not finding legal 
causation, then Merit Medical still is not liable for any 
compensation, as the applicant has also failed to establish 
that her condition was medically caused by her employment. 
To establish medical causation, an employee must prove 
that her disability "is medically the result of an exertion or 
injury that occurred during a work-related activity." 729 P.2d 
at 27. The key question is "whether, given this body and this 
exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to the injury." Id. 
at 24. This requirement serves two important purposes: it 
helps prevent an employer from becoming a general insurer, and 
it aids in discouraging fraudulent claims. Id. at 27. Medical 
causation is a question of fact for the Commission, reviewed 
under the highly deferential "substantial evidence" standard. 
Zupon v. Indus. Comm'n, 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The Commission found that the applicant failed to estab-
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lish any medical causal connection between her employment and 
her subsequent back condition. In making this finding, the 
Commission relied on the medical evidence, including a report 
provided by Dr. Gerald Moress and Dr. Wallace Hess, who 
examined the applicant and reviewed her medical records at the 
request of Merit Medical. A medical panel appointed by the 
administrative law judge suggested that there was a "limited" 
connection between the applicant's employment and her back 
problems, but the Commission concluded, after careful analysis, 
that this report was ambiguous, equivocal, and unpersuasive. 
Under the Act, the Commission has the right to decide whether 
to adopt findings made in a medical panel report, and the 
Commission's ultimate finding that the applicant failed to 
establish medical causation was supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. 
A. The Commission is not bound to adopt findings made 
in a medical panel report. 
The Industrial Commission is not required to blindly adopt 
findings presented by a medical panel. Under former section 
35-1-77 of the Workers' Compensation Act, the Commission 
commission "may" refer the medical aspects of a disputed claim 
to a medical panel. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (1) (a) (1994) 
(recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(1)(a) (1997)). 
However, the Commission must decide on its own whether to 
follow the medical panel's report: 
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The commission may base its finding and 
decision on the report of the panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants, but is not bound 
by the report if other substantial conflicting 
evidence in the case supports a contrary finding, 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(2)(d) (1994) (emphasis added) 
(recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(e) (1997)). 
Under the plain language of this statute, the Commission 
was not bound by the medical panel's report in our case. 
First, nowhere does the statute require the Commission to base 
its findings on the panel report; it simply says that the 
Commission "may" do so. Second, the report of Drs. Moress and 
Hess clearly constitutes "other substantial conflicting 
evidence in the case": the report is "other" evidence, it is 
"substantial" evidence, and it is "conflicting" evidence. 
Thus, under the plain language of the statute, the Commission 
was free to make its own factual findings. 
Utah case law also unambiguously provides that the Com-
mission is not required to follow a medical panel report. For 
example, in Greyhound Lines v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 1021 (Utah 
1986), the supreme court upheld the Commission's finding as to 
the date of stabilization, even though that finding conflicted 
with the date given by the medical panel. In that case, the 
medical panel had concluded that the applicant had reached 
stabilization three months after his industrial accident, but 
the Commission rejected this finding, instead relying on the 
fact that the applicant's treating physician did not issue an 
impairment rating until almost two full years after the 
accident. Id. at 1022. 
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The supreme court affirmed, finding that the Commission 
was not bound to follow the medical panel report: "Plaintiff 
suggests that stabilization is a medical question and that, in 
the absence of any objection, the report of the medical panel 
must be accepted. This misconstrues the role of the medical 
panel." Id. (emphasis added). Relying on the plain language 
of section 35-1-77, the court explained that "the Commission 
has the discretion to accept or reject a panel's report even in 
the absence of objections." Id. at 1023. 
The supreme court again upheld the Commission's departure 
from a medical panel report in Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. 
Keller, 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983). In that case, a medical 
panel had concluded that there was no connection between the 
employee's work and his subsequent heart attack, but another 
doctor testified to the contrary. The Commission disregarded 
the medical panel report and found that medical causation was 
established, and the supreme court once again affirmed. The 
court concluded that the Commission's finding was supported by 
the evidence, "despite the contrary findings of the medical 
panel." Id^ at 1371-72. 
There is no support in the statute, in the case law, or in 
logic, for the applicant's argument that, because the report of 
Drs. Moress and Hess was included in the medical records sub-
mitted to the medical panel, it somehow ceased to be "other 
substantial conflicting evidence" under the statute. The fact 
that the Moress/Hess report was submitted to the medical panel 
does not mean that the report ceased to exist, or that it 
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mysteriously lost its status as "evidence." The applicant's 
argument thus flies in the face of the plain language of the 
statute.7 
The Commission has the ultimate responsibility for making 
factual findings in workers' compensation cases, and it has not 
only the right, but the duty, to consider all of the relevant 
evidence in doing so. Cf. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 
828, 830 (Utah 1978). In accordance with this principle, the 
Act clearly provides that the Commission is not required to 
blindly follow a report issued by a medical panel, and Utah 
case law confirms this. Therefore, the court should hold that 
the Commission did not err by considering evidence in addition 
to the medical panel report. 
B* The Commission's factual finding that the applicant 
failed to establish medical causation should be 
affirmed. 
1. The finding should be taken as conclusive 
because the applicant has failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting it. 
As noted above, medical causation is a question of fact. 
Zupon v. Indus. Comm'n, 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
When a petitioner challenges an agency's findings of fact, the 
appellate court must uphold the findings unless the petitioner 
7In addition, it appears that in Greyhound Lines, discussed 
above, all of the relevant records had been submitted to the 
medical panel, and the supreme court still held that the Commission 
acted within its authority in rejecting the panel's report. 
Wallace, 728 P.2d at 1021. 
-37-
establishes that they are not supported by "substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1997): VanLeeuwen v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The 
party challenging findings of fact must " 'marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the 
supporting facts, the [agency's] findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence.'" VanLeeuwen, 901 P.2d at 284 (brackets 
in original). If the applicant fails to marshal the evidence 
supporting factual findings, the findings will be accepted as 
conclusive. Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In our case, the applicant appears to challenge the 
Commission's factual finding that she failed to prove medical 
causation, but she has not marshaled the evidence supporting 
that determination. To properly marshal the evidence, a 
petitioner must first set forth the evidence that supports the 
finding, and then carefully explain why that evidence is, in 
fact, insufficient. Then, only after the supporting evidence 
has been separately marshalled, can the petitioner address the 
evidence he or she claims contradicts the finding. See, e.g., 
Intermountain Health Care v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841, 844 
n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (evidence contrary to the findings 
should be referred to in briefing only after the supporting 
evidence has been separately marshalled); Heinecke v. Dep't of 
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (same). 
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However, the applicant begins by presenting the evidence 
that supports her own position, instead of the Commission's 
findings. Moreover, her discussion of the report of Drs. 
Moress and Hess focuses only on what she feels are the 
shortcomings of that report. And, she does not even address 
any of the nonmedical evidence that supports the Commission's 
findings. The law imposes a "heavy burden" on a party seeking 
to overturn an agency's factual findings, Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 
464, and the applicant has failed to carry this burden. The 
Commission's finding that there was no medical causation should 
therefore be taken as conclusive. 
2. The Commission's finding is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
Even if this court were to address this issue on the 
merits, it would conclude that the Commission's finding of no 
medical causation is supported by substantial evidence. Most 
importantly, the report from Drs. Moress and Hess unequivocally 
states that there is no causal connection between the appli-
cants employment and her back problems. R. 406-08. Doctors 
Moress and Hess examined the applicant and carefully reviewed 
her medical records. R. 400-06. They performed the standard 
credibility tests and found that the applicant's responses were 
"inappropriate" in several categories. R. 405. They reviewed 
the CT scan and noted that it showed a small disc bulge on only 
one angle, and that there was no other clear evidence of a disc 
herniation. R. 405. They also explained that the CT scan 
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revealed a "fracture of the apophyseal ring which had nothing 
to do with the industrial accident and is developmental in 
origin," R. 406. Finally, they pointed out that the applicant 
did not feel any onset of pain while at work, and that it was 
possible that she had simply been suffering from an acute low 
back strain. R. 407. Drs. Moress and Hess therefore unequivo-
cally concluded that none of the applicant's impairment, 
disability, or need for medical expenses was attributable to 
her industrial exposure. Id. 
In addition, there are numerous "historical" facts sup-
porting the Commission's finding. Most importantly, the 
applicant never felt any back pain, soreness, or stiffness 
during the entire time she worked for Merit Medical. Tran-
script, R. 113:17-21, 116:12-14. Also, the applicant's job did 
not require any heavy lifting or excessive bending: as 
discussed previously, the applicant simply lifted plastic bins 
containing small plastic parts. Cf. Allen, 729 P.2d at 27 n.9 
(evidence of ordinariness of the exertion is relevant to the 
issue of medical causation). And, if the applicant's back 
problems were really caused by her work, it is doubtful that 
her pain would have first appeared when it did, while at home 
on the day after an especially short and easy shift. 
The applicant does not really argue that this evidence is 
insufficient to support the Commission's determination. 
Instead, she presents various reasons why she feels that the 
report of Drs. Moress and Hess is less persuasive than the 
medical panel report. But these arguments are not properly 
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made on appeal. The Commission has already determined which 
report is more persuasive, and this court's role under UAPA is 
not to review that determination; rather, this court's role is 
simply to determine whether the Commission's findings are 
supported by substantial evidence. As this court has pointed 
out, "It is the province of the Board, not the appellate 
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence." Grace Drilling Co. 
v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Therefore, the court of appeals "will not substitute its 
judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even 
though we may have come to a different conclusion had the case 
come before us for de novo review." Id. 
At any rate, the Commission acted properly in choosing not 
to be persuaded by the medical penal report, for the panel 
report does not provide much support for the applicant's case. 
For example, the panel stated that her work caused only a 
"temporary aggravation," R. 418, and it could find only a 
"limited" causal connection between the applicant's job and her 
condition. R. 417. And the panel attributed merely one 
percent of the applicant's impairment to her alleged industrial 
exposure. R. 418. 
It is the applicant who bears the burden of proof in a 
workers' compensation proceeding, and she must establish 
medical causation by a preponderance of the evidence. See 
Zupon, 860 P.2d at 963. The Commission was certainly within 
its discretion in deciding that the uncertain medical panel 
report was not sufficient to meet that burden, particularly 
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when faced with the more definite, better reasoned report of 
Drs. Moress and Hess and the nonmedical facts set forth above. 
As the applicant herself admits, this is a close case. The 
Commission has made its decision, the decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, and the decision is entitled to 
deference. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents Merit Medical Systems, Inc., and TIG Insurance 
Co. hereby respectfully request that this court enter an order 
affirming the Industrial Commission's ruling in this case. 
DATED this 5th day of December, 1997. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Merit Medical Systems, Inc. 
TIG Insurance Co. 
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I hereby certify that on the 5th day of December, 1997, 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing were hand-
delivered to the following: 
Phillip B. Shell 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUEST 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Alan Hennebold 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Attorney for Respondent 
Industrial Commission 
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Tabl 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
LORI WARNER, 
Applicant, 
v. 
MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC. 
and TIG INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Merit Medical Systems, Inc. and its workers' compensation 
insurance carrier, TIG Insurance Company (referred to jointly as 
"Merit" hereafter), ask The Industrial Commission of Utah to review 
the Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits to Lori Warner 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this 
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Was Ms. Warner's work at Merit both the legal cause and the 
medical cause of the injury for which she now seeks workers' 
compensation benefits? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Ms. Warner seeks temporary total disability compensation, 
permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses for 
a back injury allegedly caused by her work at Merit. Specifically, 
she contends that cumulative trauma from her work resulted in pain 
beginning March 24, 1995, which necessitated surgery in June 1995 
to remove the disc at the L5-S1 level of her spine. 
Ms. Warner began employment at Merit during January 1995, as 
a molding operator. She worked the swing shift five days a week, 
8 hours a day, servicing machines that produced plastic parts for 
medical devices. As the machines produced the parts, they fell 
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into bins with dimensions of 35" x 18" x 18". Ms. Warner would 
remove the bins from the machines and carry them several feet to a 
table where she emptied the bins into larger containers. 
On average, Ms. Warner emptied 9 bins an hour. On some 
machines the bins were at waist level, while on other machines the 
bins were on the floor. The bins weighed between 5 and 26 pounds 
depending on how much product they contained. The heavier hoppers 
tended to be at floor level. Because she was afraid of receiving 
electrical shocks from the machines, Ms. Warner stood as far as 
possible from them, which required her to lean over to pull the 
bins from the machines. 
Also as part of her duties, Ms. Warner periodically carried a 
bin across the manufacturing room to a set of scales that were at 
the height of her head. Additionally, she periodically checked the 
dimensions of various parts by placing them on a table and 
measuring them with calibers and gauges. She also vacuumed and 
cleaned around her machines. 
Ms. Warner has not identified any unusual work activity or any 
pain related to her work prior to March 24, 1995. On March 23, 
1995, she left work early with a headache caused by dental 
problems. The next morning, she awoke with back pain and found it 
difficult: to walk. She sought medical attention at an Instacare 
clinic and was given a prescription for a muscle relaxant. She did 
not report to work as scheduled on March 25, 1995 due to her back 
pain. Then, on March 28, 19 95, she underwent a CT scan and was 
diagnosed with 1) degenerative disc changes at the L5-S1 level of 
her spine; 2) a bulging disc with possible herniated fragments at 
the L4-5 level; and 3) evidence of old trauma at both sites. 
On April 7, 1995, Ms. Warner was examined by Dr. Smith and 
again diagnosed with degeneration at the L5-S1 and L4-5 levels, 
with possible extruded fragments. Dr. Smith prescribed 
conservative treatment, but after such conservative therapy failed 
to alleviate Ms. Warner's pain, he performed a discectomy at the 
L5-S1 level. 
After surgery, Ms. Warner experienced some relief from her 
back pain. Her recovery was uneventful and she was placed on 
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physical therapy for several months. She returned to work for a 
time, but eventually stopped work due to continuing back pain. 
Dr. Smith has expressed a very brief, conclusionary opinion 
that Ms. Warner's work at Merit was a cause of her back pain and 
ensuing surgery. Merit then employed Dr. Moress, a neurologist, 
and Dr. Hess, an orthopedist, to examine Ms. Warner and review her 
medical records. Based on this evaluation, the doctors noted that 
Ms. Warner's back pain did not occur at work and that she could not 
recall any specific work event that might have triggered the pain. 
They concluded that she suffered from ''fractured apophyseal rings" 
at the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels with associated bulging discs, but 
that such conditions were developmental in nature and not related 
to her work at Merit. 
In light of the difference of opinion between Dr. Smith on one 
hand and Dr. Hess and Dr. Moress on the other, the ALJ appointed a 
medical panel consisting of Dr. Smoot, an orthopedist, and Dr. 
Thomas, a neurologist, to evaluate the medical aspects of Ms. 
Warner's claim. The panel examined Ms. Warner and reviewed her 
medical records, then submitted a report finding a "limited" 
causal connection between her work and her back problems. The 
panel did not explain what it meant by a "limited" causal 
connection, but did point out that Ms. Warner's x-rays showed 
preexisting back problems resulting from "old changes". The 
medical panel concluded that Ms. Warner had a 5% whole person 
impairment due to her low back problems, but that only 1% was 
attributable to her work at Merit. The panel attributed the 
remaining 4% impairment to her pre-existing problems. Finally, the 
panel concluded that Ms. Warner's medical care and surgery was 
necessary to care for her work related injury "to a limited 
extent." The medical panel commented: 
It is quite possible that the surgery may not have been 
needed at that time had there been more concern for the 
functional aspect of her reaction to her total 
circumstances. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires employers and 
their workers' compensation insurance carriers to provide 
disability compensation and medical care to employees injured by 
accidents "arising out of and in the course of their employment." 
In order to qualify for such benefits, an injured worker must 
establish by a preponderance of evidence that 1) the employee's 
work is the legal cause of the injury for which benefits are 
sought; and 2) the employee's work is the medical cause of the 
injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
Because Merit contends that Ms. Warner's work at Merit was 
neither the legal cause nor the medical cause of her injuries, the 
Industrial Commission will consider both issues. 
I. LEGAL CAUSATION: 
In order to obtain benefits under Utah's Workers' Compensation 
Act, a worker with a preexisting medical condition must prove 
that his or her work is the legal cause of the injury for which 
benefits are claimed. This requirement of legal causation is met 
when the worker shows an unusual or extraordinary exertion at work 
that exceeds the exertions experienced by a typical individual in 
everyday nonemployment life. Allen at 25. 
The evidence in this case establishes that Ms. Warner suffers 
from a preexisting low back condition related to the injury for 
which she now seeks workers' compensation benefits. She must, 
therefore, show some unusual or extraordinary exertion arising from 
her work at Merit. In other words, she must prove that her 
employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk 
she already faced because of her preexisting condition. 
The Industrial Commission has carefully considered the demands 
of Ms. Warner's work at Merit, as well as the manner in which Ms. 
Warner performed those duties, and concludes that her work 
exertions were not unusual or extraordinary when compared to the 
typical exertions of modern day life. The lifting, carrying and 
standing that Ms. Warner did at Merit is not different from the 
exertions involved in changing a flat tire, doing laundry, 
moving garbage cans and recycling bins, lawn care, or caring for 
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young children, to mention just a few everyday activities. The 
Industrial Commission recognizes that Ms. Warner's work required 
her to carry as many as 9 bins an hour, but the bins were not heavy 
and usually were not carried very far. When the full range of all 
non-employment activities are considered, even the frequency of Ms. 
Warner's lifting and carrying at work is not unusual or 
extraordinary. The Industrial Commission therefore finds that Ms. 
Warner's work at Merit is not the legal cause of her injury. 
X L MEDICAL CAUSATION: 
In order to establish medical causation, an injured worker 
must establish a medically demonstrable causal link between the 
stress, strain or exertion of the worker's employment and the 
worker's injuries. Allen at 27. In considering whether Ms. Warner 
has established such a link between her work at Merit and her 
injuries, the Industrial Commission looks primarily to the opinions 
of the medical experts who are familiar with Ms. Warner's medical 
history and her current complaints. 
Dr. Smith, who performed surgery on Ms. Warner's back, has 
reported that her back injury is work related. In making this 
assessment, Dr. Smith apparently relies on Ms. Warner's 
representation to him that her back pain was ''brought on" by her 
work. This statement is contrary to the fact that Ms. Warner did 
not experience back pain at work, but rather, began to suffer back 
pain when she awoke in the morning, after she had been away from 
work for most of a day. 
Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess, the specialists who examined Ms. 
Warner on behalf of Merit, have stated their unequivocal opinion 
that Ms. Warner's current low back problems are not caused by her 
work, but are entirely the result of preexisting conditions. This 
opinion is persuasive because it is supported by a thorough review 
of Ms. Warner's medical records, as well as physical examination of 
Ms. Warner. The doctors' opinion also appears consistent with 
circumstances surrounding the onset of Ms. Warner's low back 
problems during March 1995. 
The final opinion regarding medical causation is that of the 
medical panel appointed by the ALJ. As did Dr. Moress and Dr. 
Hess, the medical panel thoroughly reviewed Ms. Warner's medical 
-1157 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
LORI WARNER 
PAGE 6 
records and examined Ms. Warner. However, on the issue of medical 
causation, the panel was unusually equivocal when it concluded 
there was "a limited medically demonstrable causal connection" 
between Ms. Warner's work and her low back pain. The panel did not 
explain what it meant by a "limited" causal connection, but the 
panel specifically noted that Ms. Warner's x-rays showed pre-
existing injuries. On the question of whether Ms. Warner's surgery 
had been necessary to treat a work related injury, the medical 
panel was even more ambiguous. 
In considering the probative value of the three medical 
opinions cited above, the Industrial Commission gives least weight 
to Dr. Smith's statements because they lack detail and foundation. 
The Industrial Commission finds the medical panel's report somewhat 
unpersuasive because of its ambiguous and equivocating answers. In 
contrast, the report of Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess is well reasoned 
and consistent with the circumstances under which Ms. Warner began 
to experience low back pain. The Industrial Commission therefore 
accepts the opinion of Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess that there is no 
medical causal connection between Ms. Warner's work at Merit and 
her low back injury. 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission concludes that Ms. Warner has failed 
to establish that her work at Merit is the legal and medical cause 
of the low back injury for which she seeks workers' compensation 
benefits. The Industrial Commission therefore grants Merit's 
motion for review, sets aside the ALJ's order, and dismisses Ms. 
Warner's application for benefits. It is so ordered. 
Dated th March , 1997. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
LORI WARNER 
PAGE 7 
DISSENT: 
The Commission, through its Administrative Law Judges, 
utilizes medical panels on a continuing basis. The Commission 
routinely remands those cases decided by ALJ's without the use of 
medical panels if the Commission finds that medical issues, 
opinions, or expenses need to be resolved by a medical panel as 
delineated in administrative rule R568-1-9. This instant case 
involves the use of a medical panel to assist the Commission in 
resolving the differing medical opinions raised by the treating 
physician and reviewing medical doctors paid by the insurance 
company. 
The majority doesn't accept the response from the medical 
panel report wherein it states "There is a limited medically 
demonstrable causal connection...." (page 6). My colleagues have 
decided that the medical panel's conclusion was "unusually 
equivocal" through the panel's use of the word "limited". The 
majority also gives little weight to the treating physician's 
opinion that there is a "medically demonstrative causal 
relationship between the industrial accident and the problems [he 
has] been treating". The majority apparently feels that the 
treating physician merely automatically accepted what Ms. Warner 
told him regarding the pain and its source and, therefore, his 
response in "To Whom It May Concern" and in the Summary of Medical 
Record (form 113) simply restates his lack of knowledge, even 
though he surely had the most fundamental and intimate 
understanding of the claimant's problem as he was also the surgeon 
as well as the treating physician. 
This case epitomizes what is so difficult in these issues. It 
is such a close call that even the medical panel obviously 
struggled with the decision. And because it is so close, one must 
recognize that even though the most conscientious in the medical 
community who are being hired by an insurance company (as is the 
case here) easily and almost automatically arrive at decisions that 
do not favor the claimant. That is precisely why the medical panel 
system is used. It is my understanding that the medical panel 
concept was created to avoid the possibility of representational 
bias as the panel is paid by the Commission through a statutorily 
described method. Certainly, that is the logic behind its 
continued useage today. By rejecting the opinion of the 
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Commission's own medical experts, I believe the majority stretches 
beyond its capability and knowledge to adequately judge this case 
and, in effect, ignores the fundamental purpose of the medical 
panel in arriving at its conclusion. 
Also, Section 35-1-77(2)(d) states rather clearly that "The 
commission may base its finding and decision on the report of the 
panel . . . but is not bound by the report if other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding". 
(underline added for emphasis) In this instant case, the medical 
panel reviewed all the medical facts including the opinion of the 
insurance company's paid reviewing medical doctors. The panel also 
examined the claimant. There is no other substantial conflicting 
evidence. (underline added for emphasis) My reading of this 
statutory language is that the legislature has allowed the 
Commission to use medical panel reports as the foundation of its 
findings regarding medical issues. By adding the other language of 
"not bound by" and "if" regarding "other substantial conflicting 
evidence", the legislature restricted the Commission's discretion 
normally allowed by the use of the word "may". Therefore, 
following the premise of this reading, I would conclude that my 
colleagues' decision may not be consistent with the requirements of 
the statute. 
[IS / 7 # c DATED THI  / S * day of March, 1997. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
NQTICS OF APPEAL RIgHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this 
Order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial 
Commission. Any such request for reconsideration must be received 
by the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this 
order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah 
Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court 
within 3 0 days of the date of this order. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
February 6, 1996 at 10:00 o' clock a.m. Said 
hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was represented by Phillip Shell, 
Attorney. 
The defendants were represented by Theodore Kanell, 
Attorney. 
This case involves a claim for temporary total compensation 
(TTC), medical expenses and permanent impairment benefits related 
to low back injury caused by cummulative trauma on the job. The 
defendants deny all liabiity in this case, based primarily on the 
lack of a medical causal connection between the applicant/s work 
exposure and the back problems that she began having on March 24, 
1995. The defendants also assert that any back injury she 
sustained is non-compensable, as she had a contributory pre-
existing condition and was not injured as a result of any unusual 
exertion (as required for compensability, per the ruling in Allen 
v. Industrial Commissionf 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)). The applicant 
relies on the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. J. L. Smith, 
to support her contention that her back problems and need for 
surgery are related to repetitive bending, twisting and lifting in 
her job with Merit Medical Systems, Inc. She claims TTC from March 
24, 1995 through September 21, 1995 (she returned to work on 
September 22, 1995), medical expenses and permanent impairment 
benefits (she has been rated by her own treating physician, Dr. J. 
L! Smith at 5% whole person and by the defendants' chosen 
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physician, Dr. G. Moress, at 10% whole person). The defendants 
rely on the opinion of their chosen physician, Dr. G. Moress, to 
support their contention that there is no medical causal connection 
between the applicant's back problems and her work at Merit Medical 
Systems, Inc. 
Because of the divergent medical opinions regarding the 
causal connection between the applicant's injury/condition and her 
work at Merit Medical, the ALJ determined that the matter should be 
referred to a medical panel for additional input on the causal 
controversy. The matter was referred to the medical panel on May 
14, 1996. The medical panel report was received at the Commission 
on July 11, 1996, and was distributed to the parties on that same 
date, with 15 days allowed for the filing of objections. On July 
25, 1996, the ALJ received comments from the applicant. On August 
16, 1996, the ALJ received comments/argument from the defendants. 
The matter was considered ready for order as of July 26, 1996. 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED: 
The applicant is a female who was 35 years old on March 24, 
1995, with no spouse nor minor children. She was employed with 
Merit Medical Systems, Inc. at that time, as a molding operator, 
working 40 hours per week, earning a wage of $7.30/hour. The 
applicant began performing this job in January of 1995 and she 
worked swing shift, from 2:00 PM to 10:00 PM. The applicant's job 
consisted of servicing a number of large machines that manufactured 
plastic medical parts, such as syringe barrels, angioplasty barrels 
and "cock manifolds." The machines were quite large, measuring 
over 5 feet tall and over 10 feet long. A drawing of one of the 
machines was submitted at hearing and was marked as Exhibit A-l. 
A video was also shown at hearing in which several of the machines 
are seen. The applicant has argued that the drawing and the video 
do not show the full range of machines that she serviced and that 
some of the machines were quite different than the ones seen on the 
video. The defendants apparently feel that any difference in the 
machines serviced by the applicant is irrelevant to the nature of 
the applicant's work duties. 
One of the applicant's main responsibilities was to empty 
a plastic tote that was positioned on the machine4 to catch the 
completed parts as the machine produced them. Apparently, the size 
of the totes is not in dispute. The applicant described the totes 
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as being 2% feet by 1% feet by 1% feet and she estimated that they 
weighed 5 pounds when empty. The weight of the totes when they 
were to be emptied and the number of totes that the applicant 
handled in an average shift are very much in dispute. 
The applicant estimated that the totes weighed anywhere from 
5 pounds to 35 pounds when she emptied them, with the average tote 
weighing around 25 pounds. Rex Teitgen, the molding manager at the 
time that the applicant was working for Merit Medical, testified 
that the heaviest tote, per a read-out of the scales where the 
totes were weighed, was 26 pounds. Therefore, it is the defendants 
position that the average tote weighed considerably less than 25 
pounds. There was quite a bit of confusion regarding in the 
testimony regarding how many totes needed to be emptied per hour. 
The number of totes to be handled was dependent upon a number of 
variables. First, this depended on how many machines a worker was 
handling at any given time. The machines were located in a very 
large room and there were 5 to 8 workers working together in the 
room at one time. Apparently, most workers were responsible for 
just 3 machines at a time. However, when a worker needed to go on 
break or lunch, the other workers filled in and took care of the 
machines assigned to the absent worker. The defendants 
acknowledged that this occurred, but it is unclear if the defense 
witnesses took this into consideration in estimating how often a 
worker would be emptying a tote. The applicant estimated that she 
emptied 3 totes per hour off each machine for which she was 
responsible (at least 9 totes total per hour). However, she stated 
that this was when the machines were set to produce at a maximum 
rate, which was not all the time. Rex Teitgen, the molding 
manager, estimated that a worker would be emptying just 4 totes per 
hour total. 
Per the video, the totes were emptied by sliding the tote 
out from the machine and walking several feet over to a table where 
the contents of the tote were either poured into a plastic bag (if 
the parts were quite small) or were lifted out by the handful and 
placed into another larger tote (if the parts were somewhat 
larger). Although Rex Teitgen testified that all the totes were 
located in the same place on all the machines (waist height or just 
below), the applicant testified that on some of the machines, the 
tote was located on the floor, requiring the worker to bend over to 
pick up the tote so it could be emptied. The applicant stated that 
the machines that had the totes on the floor manufactured the 
larger heavier parts. In addition, the applicant stated that she 
wbuld get an electrical shock from some of the machines as she 
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emptied the totes, if any part of her body touched the machine as 
she did so. In order to avoid this shock, the applicant stated 
that she would stand as far away from the machine as she could and 
then would lean and reach over to pull the tote out. Rex Teitgen 
testified that no one ever reported to him that they were shocked 
by any of the machines. 
In addition to emptying the totes on the machines, the 
workers were required to periodically take a tote or bag of 
completed parts over to a table where the parts were weighed by the 
worker and measured. Once again, there was considerable disparity 
between the testimony of the applicant and the defense witnesses on 
what was required for this task. The applicant referred to 
carrying the totes across the large room to a weighing table. Then 
she stated she needed to lift the tote full of parts to head height 
in order to get it on the scale. She stated that she then lifted 
the tote off the scale and carried it over to the quality assurance 
(QA) inspectors. About once per hour, the applicant stated she 
also had to spend some time standing at a table checking dimensions 
on the manunfactured parts. She used calipers and pin gauges to do 
this. She stated that she was allowed to sit or stand, but felt 
that the supervisors preferred the workers to stand so they could 
quickly get back to service a machine, if necessary. The applicant 
estimated that the measuring took about 20 minutes, during which 
the machines would continue to produce parts. The applicant stated 
tha the machine totes could get quite full while she was away doing 
the measuring and this resulted in heavier totes. Rex Teitgen, the 
molding manager, stated that he felt the measuring would take only 
10-12 minutes, but admitted that this was based on all workers 
being present without consideration of need to fill in for a worker 
on lunch or breaks. 
The video shows that the large totes into which the parts 
were dumped were located on wheeled carts. Rex Teitgen stated that 
there was no need to carry these totes over to the scale. He 
indicated that they could be wheeled over to the scale on the cart. 
However, the applicant stated that the video shows the current set-
up at Merit Medical and that this set-up is not the same as it was 
when she worked there. She stated that initially there were no 
wheeled carts on which to move the totes and they had to be carried 
over to the scale. In addition, she stated that when the carts 
were obtained, there was not a cart assigned to each machine and 
therefore a cart was not always available for transporting the 
larger totes to the scale. Teitgen testified that he felt that 
e\ren though there was only 3 wheeled carts during early 1995, that 
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a cart would always be available for the workers to transport the 
totes. He stated that he never personally saw a worker carrying a 
tote over to the scale, but he could not say that it never 
happened. 
The applicant testified that she needed to move quickly and 
continually in order to service 3 machines and that there was no 
time when she was just standing or sitting. In addition to 
servicing the machines, the applicant stated that she periodically 
needed to vacumn the floors at the end of the shift to pick up"any 
fallen parts. The applicant also testified that she felt the video 
was not necessarily representative of her work duties, for the 
reasons already noted, and because she stated that the video showed 
the day shift, whereas she worked swing shift. Unfortunately, it 
was not clear to the ALJ what specifically was different about the 
two shifts. 
On March 23, 1995, the applicant was working her normal 
shift, but went home early that day. She left early due to a 
headache that was related to a dental problem. The applicant 
testified that the next morning, on March 24, 1995, she awoke with 
low back pain radiating to her right buttocks and down past her 
knee. The applicant stated that she had difficulty walking at that 
time, as well. She stated that she could not recall anything 
unusual about her work duties in the weeks just preceding March 24, 
1995. The applicant went to the Holladay Instacare on March 24, 
1995 with complaints of back pain and pain walking noted at the 
clinic. The record for that visit is handwritten and very 
illegible. The applicant testified that she was given a 
prescription for muscle relaxants. She rested the rest of that day 
and the next and was scheduled to work March 26, 1995. She stated 
she called in to work on that day and indicated that she would not 
be there due to problems she was having walking. 
The follow-up she got after going to Instacare is somewhat 
unclear. The medical record exhibit, Exhibit D-l, does not show 
any follow-up at Instacare. There is a March 28, 1995 report of a 
CT scan of the lumbar spine, with the referring physician being Dr. 
Clark Newhall. It is unclear how the applicant got referred for 
this scan and what involvement Dr. Newhall had in the applicant's 
care. The CT scan was read as follows: 
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1. Degenerative disc changes L5-S1 with Grade 
I-II central disc bulge and associated 
irregular calcification possibly 
representing old ring apophyseal avulsion. 
No significant neural element compromise. 
2. Grade I diffuse bulge L4-5 with associated 
suspected small Grade I-II superiorly 
extruded herniated fragment. There is also 
irregularity of the posterior ring apophysis 
suggesting old trauma to this apophysis as 
well. 
3. Otherwise unremarkable CT of the lumbar 
spine. 
The applicant testified that Cottonwood Hospital referred 
her to Dr. J. L. Smith. Dr. Smith saw the applicant for the first 
time on April 7, 1995 and he noted that she had injured her back on 
March 24, 1995 and had pain and difficulty in the buttocks since 
that time. He read X-rays to show degeneration at L5-S1 (grade I-
II) and some at L4-5 with a possible extruded fragment. He 
prescribed anti-inflammatories and exercise and noted that if the 
applicant did not improve he "might have to go after the extruded 
fragment." When Dr. Smith saw the applicant again on April 13, 
1995, he noted that the applicant was worse and that an attempt to 
return to work was unsuccessful. He took the applicant off work, 
referred her for physical therapy and noted that he planned to 
schedule surgery, if she was still symptomatic by May 2, 1995. 
The applicant was seen at Southwest Emergency on April 14, 
1995 with complaints of back pain that had begun on March 24, 1995. 
It was noted that the pain was in the low back and hips, with the 
right buttocks pain resolved. No numbness or tingling was 
reported. The report notes that the applicant originally had 
thought that her symptoms were flu related. Also noted was the 
fact that her job involved alot of bending, but not lifting of more 
than 20 pounds. An acute lumbar strain was diagnosed and the 
applicant was referred back to Dr. Smith for follow-up. The 
attending physician noted that he was not sure if her problem was 
work related. When Dr. Smith saw her again on May 2, 1995, he 
noted that the applicant was no better and that physical therapy 
had not helped. He noted that the applicant had low back pain 
radiating down her leg that she was unable stand anymore. He noted 
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that he informed the applicant that surgery offered a 50-70% chance 
of helping her. It was decided that he would go forward with a 
discectomy. 
The applicant was at Cottonwood Hospital from June 5, 1995 
through June 7, 1995 for the surgery. The records for the visit 
and surgery are somewhat confusing. The history and physical 
examination report notes that the applicant had a history of right 
leg pain only for 3 months. The diagnosis is listed as herniated 
disc at L4-5 and encroachment on L5-S1. Although the procedure on 
the operative report is listed as: discectomy L4-5 and right 
exploration L5-S1, the actual report suggests that an L5-S1 
discectomy was the only procedure performed. After the surgery, 
the applicant followed-up with Dr. Smith. The applicant stated 
that the surgery did help in that she was able to walk afterwards 
and could not prior to the surgery. However, she stated that she 
still had low back pain and buttocks pain, as of the date of the 
hearing, and she stated she was still taking medication and seeing 
Dr. Smith, as of that time. 
Dr. Smith completed a Summary of Medical Record form dated 
June 22, 1995. On that form he notes an affirmative answer to the 
question regarding a causal connection between the work injury and 
the treatment offered (the reference to a March 24, 1992 is 
apparently a mistake). He notes future treatment as physical 
therapy and the permanent impairment rating as unknown. Dr. Smith 
also wrote a letter to-whom-it-may-concern dated August 10, 1995. 
In that letter, Dr. Smith notes an August 1986 slip in the shower, 
but notes that the applicant had no back pain after that until 
March 24, 1995. The one record with respect to the 1986 shower 
incident is an FHP urgent care visit note. It indicates that the 
applicant slipped in the shower and tried to catch herself, but did 
not fall. It notes extreme low back pain, with an injection and 
prescription medication offered as treatment. The applicant stated 
that this resolved in one or two days. Dr. Smith's August 10, 1995 
letter goes on to note that the applicant told him that her pain 
was brought on by her work, where she did repetitive lifting and 
bending type motions. In this letter, Dr. Smith notes that the 
applicant had an extruded fragment at L4-5, for which he did a 
discectomy and exploration of L5-S1. In a letter dated January 4, 
1996, Dr. Smith notes that the applicant had reached maximum 
medical improvement and had a 5% whole person rating. 
^•j%3± 
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The applicant was seen by Dr. G. Moress and Dr. W. Hess on 
January 22, 1996 at the request of the defendants. The report for 
that examination notes that the applicant complained of pain of 
6/10 at the time of the visit, the same level as pre-surgery. 
Buttocks aching and leg tingling were also noted as complaints. 
The report states that the doctors read the CT scan to show a small 
disc bulge at L4-5 and possibly one at L5-S1, without any 
compromise of the neural structures. The fracture of the 
apophyseal ring seen on the CT was developmental in origin per Dr. 
Moress and Dr. Hess. Dr. Moress and Hess note that it was unclear 
to them which level of the applicant's spine Dr. Smith operated on 
and what exactly he did in the operation. Dr. Moress and Hess 
include in their diagnostic impression a diagnosis of pain disorder 
characterized by psychological factors. The doctors note that the 
applicant's examination was replete with inappropriate credibility 
tests. Because the applicant's pain began away from the work 
place, the doctors conclude that it was difficult to assign the 
applicant's work as the cause of her back injury/condition. The 
doctors rated the applicant at 10% whole person, all of which they 
found to be unrelated to the applicant's work. 
PRELIMINARY FACT CONCLUSIONS: 
With respect to factual conclusions regarding the specifics 
of the applicant's work duties, the ALJ will need to simply offer 
ranges in the weights and number of repetitions involved. The 
testimony was rather divergent and there were no obvious 
credibility problems, so that the ALJ must conclude that the two 
witnesses (the applicant and Teitgen) just honestly estimate 
differently. With respect to the average weight of the totes, the 
ALJ finds that they weighed anywhere from 5-20 pounds generally, 
with some occasionally weighing up to 26 pounds. The applicant 
herself apparently told the Southwest Emergency personnel that she 
did not lift in excess of 20 pounds and thus the ALJ finds the 
applicant's hearing testimony of an average of 25 pounds to be 
somewhat of a high estimate. With respect to the number of times 
the applicant had to empty a machine tote, the ALJ accepts the 
applicant's testimony of at least 9 times per hour, as the ALJ 
believes that Teitgen's testimony did not account for times when 
the applicant may have been operating more than just her 3 assigned 
machines. The ALJ also accepts the applicant's testimony that she 
did carry totes to the scale, rather than pushing them on a cart, 
as the carts were either totally unavailable or only occasionally 
available for her use. The ALJ finds that the video gives only a 
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very general idea of the applicant's work site and work duties, and 
should not be accepted as an exact representation of the work the 
applicant performed. 
THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT: 
In addition to her back symptoms, the panel report notes 
that the applicant currently has irritable bowel syndrome and 
currently takes medication (doxepin) for stress management. The 
panel notes that the applicant feels that she has emotional 
problems. The panel notes that the applicant's pain diagram shows 
symptoms in all 4 limbs and over most of the spine/back. The panel 
also notes that the applicant acknowledged a long history of 
depression (with past treatment) . With respect to the back, the 
panel noted that the applicant did have prior X-ray evidence of 
"changes." Even so, the panel concluded that there was a "limited" 
medical causal connection between the applicant's low back problems 
and her work exposure from January 1995 through March 1995. The 
panel specified this limited connection to be a work aggravation of 
her prior impaired condition, occurring in a "setting of 
psychologic overlay." However, the panel found that the 
applicant's gastro-intestinal problems and her depressive symptoms 
were long-standing and were not caused by her work exposure. Low 
back treatment after March 24, 1995 was found to be necessitated by 
the work exposure, including the June 5, 1995 surgery. With 
respect to the surgery, the panel did comment as follows: 
It is quite possible that the surgery may not have 
been needed at that time had there been more 
concern for the functional aspect of her reaction 
to her total circumstances. 
The panel rated the applicant's low back condition at 5% whole 
person, attributing 1% whole person to the applicant's early 1995 
work exposure and 4% whole person to pre-existing conditions. The 
panel also found that the applicant medically stabilized about 3 
months after the June 5, 1995 surgery. 
OBJECTIONS/COMMENTS FROM THE PARTIES: 
The comments filed by the applicant include a hand-written 
letter noting a list of additional facts, and some correction of 
panel facts, mostly in reference to symptoms, activity and work 
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dating after the applicant's work exposure at Merit Medical. The 
list also includes some refinements on the testing and symptoms 
that occurred at the time that the applicant was seen at Southwest 
Emergency. There is no argument submitted with this listing, and 
in fact, the applicant's attorney included a cover letter with the 
listing, noting that the applicant understood that her comments did 
not necessarily raise any medical or legal issue sufficient to 
controvert the panel's report. 
The comments filed by the defendants note that the 
defendants did not file objections to the medical panel report, 
because the report seemed to indicate that Merit Medical should not 
be responsible for payment of the surgery. The comments also note 
that the defendants object to any claim for bladder problems. With 
respect to the overall panel report, the defendants make an unclear 
argument that there "may be a serious question as to the viability 
of the medical panel report" and an insufficient "level of degree 
of medical certainty" on the medical causal conclusion, due to the 
applicant's "attacks upon the medical panel report." In closing, 
the defendants note that they were reasserting the legal causation 
argument (i.e. no unusual exertion) earilier made. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Medical Cause: 
The ALJ adopts the medical panel report to resolve the 
medical causal issues in this case. The ALJ does so because the 
panel report is the most soundly based medical opinion that clearly 
addresses all the medical questions relevant to the applicant's 
entitlement to benefits. In addition, the ALJ finds that there 
have been no real objections to the panel findings and conclusions. 
The defendants make an effort at stating some objection to the 
panel findings on causation, but their argument in this regard is 
difficult for the ALJ to understand and appears to relate back to 
the applicant's comments, which are not really objections either. 
As the ALJ can find no clearly explained objections to the panel's 
conclusions, the ALJ finds that there are no real objections to the 
report. As such, the ALJ adopts the panel findings. 
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Although the panel commented on the interplay between the 
applicant's "functional" or psychological concerns and her back 
injury, the panel did not go so far as to make any conclusions that 
the applicant's back problems were solely functional. Instead, the 
panel clearly states that it found the back treatment necessitated 
by the applicant's work exposure at Merit Medical in early 1995. 
In conjunction with this, and consistent with this, the panel 
specifically found that the back surgery was necessitated by the 
work exposure. The panel stated this in very clear terms on page 
seven of the report, under item number eight. Therefore, the ALJ 
does not understand how the defendants read the report to indicate 
otherwise. The panel did merely comment that, had the fucntional 
concerns been investigated more closely, it may have been 
determined that the surgery was unnecessary. However, the panel is 
clear in their conclusion regarding the medical causal connection 
between the work exposure and the surgery and makes the above-noted 
comment only as a suggestion as to a different result that could 
have happened, but did not. 
Based on the above-explained interpretation of the medical 
panel report and the above-explained reasons for adopting that 
report, the ALJ adopts the panel conclusion that the applicant's 
work exposure at Merit Medical medically caused her subsequent back 
treatment and surgery. Consistently, the ALJ also adopts the panel 
finding that the applicant has a 1% whole person permanent 
impairment to her low back as a result of the work exposure. 
Legal Cause: 
In adopting the medical panel conclusions, the ALJ also 
adopts the panel conclusion that the applicant had a contributory 
pre-existing low back impairment (rated at 4% whole person). As a 
result, per the Allen case cited at that beginning of this order, 
in order for the applicant's back injury to be compensable, the 
injury must have occurred as a result of exertion greater than what 
is experienced away from work by the average late-20th century 
individual. Although the ALJ finds the ruling in Allen quite 
logical and certainly preferable to the jumble of conflicting 
opinions that existed prior to its issuance, the ALJ still has 
considerable difficulty in applying the "unusual exertion" standard 
to certain facts, especially in cases such as this, where there is 
no obvious unusual strain (like lifting 100 pounds or doing 
something rapidly over and over many times) . Depending on who you 
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pick to be the "average" person, the applicant's lifting/carrying 
of 5 to 20 pounds, 9 times per hour, may be more exertive or less 
exertive than the average person's non-employment activities. 
However, the ALJ finds that some consideration must be given to how 
the lifting/carrying occurred. 
In this case, the ALJ found that the applicant stood far 
away from the machines, and reached over with her arms 
outstretched, to remove the totes from the machines. The ALJ found 
that she did this in order to avoid a potential electrical shock 
that she felt might occur if she stood too closely to the machine. 
Regardless of whether or not these electrical shocks were reality, 
the applicant testified, and the ALJ accepted, that she had great 
concern regarding this potential shocking. The exaggerated posture 
would seem to the ALJ to cause her activity to be more strenuous 
then had she stood close to the machine, and lifted the totes or 
bins keeping them close to her body, as she did so. Taking this 
into consideration, and without any real guidelines to use in 
determining what "average" people do in their non-employment lives, 
the ALJ concludes that the lifting of the 5-20 pound totes in this 
exaggerated manner, nine times per hour, is slightly more exertive 
than what the average person does in their everyday non-employment 
lives. As such, the ALJ concludes that legal causation is 
established. 
BENEFITS DUE: 
Medical and legal causation established, the ALJ finds that 
the applicant sustained a compensable industrial injury as a result 
of her work activities at Merit Medical in early 1995. The 
applicant's compensation rate is figured as follows: $7.3 0/hour x 
40 hours/week = $292.00/week x .667 = $194.76 or $195.00/week, when 
rounded off as required by U.C.A. 35-1-75. Based on the 
conclusions of the medical panel, the applicant is due temporary 
total compensation (TTC) for the period of medical instability, 
apparently from March 24, 1995 through September 5, 1995 (3 months 
after the June 5, 1995 surgery) . That period is 23 weeks and 5 
days, or 23.714 weeks. The TTC award is thus $195.00/week x 23.714 
weeks, or a total of $4,624.23. Permanent impairment benefits are 
based on the 1% whole person rating offered by the panel. This 
would entitle the applicant to an additional 3.12 weeks (312 weeks 
for the whole person x .01) of benefits or $608.40 ($195.00/week x 
3.12 weeks). The applicant's total award is thus $5,232.63 
($4,624.23 TTC + $608.40 PPI). Attorney fees, per R568-1-7, are 
$1,046.53 ($5,232.63 X .20). 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Merit Medical 
Systems, Inc./TIG Insurance, pay the applicant, Lori Warner, 
temporary total compensation, at the rate of $195.00 per week, for 
23.714 weeks, or a total of $4,624.23, for the period of medical 
instability related to the early 1995 back injury, from March 24, 
1995 to September 5, 1995. That amount is accrued and due and 
payable in a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 
35-1-78, and less the attorney fees to be awarded below. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Merit Medical 
Systems, Inc./TIG Insurance, pay all medical expenses incurred as 
the result of the early 1995 back injury, as outlined in the order 
above; said expenses to be paid in accordance with the medical and 
surgical fee schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Merit Medical 
Systems, Inc./TIG Insurance, pay the applicant, Lori Warner, 
permanent impairment benefits, at the rate of $195.00 per week, for 
3.12 weeks, or a total of $608.40, for the 1% whole person 
permanent impairment resulting from the early 1995 back injury. 
That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump sum, plus 
interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Merit Medical 
Systems, Inc./TIG Insurance, pay Phillip Shell, attorney for the 
applicant, the sum of $1,046.53, plus 20.% of the interest on the 
award, per R568-1-7, for services rendered in this matter, the same 
to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the applicant, and to be 
remitted directly to the office of Phillip Shell. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Commission within 
thirty (3 0) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the 
particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the 
Commission within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order 
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. If a Motion 
for Review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days of 
the date hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed 
within fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion 
for Review by the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-
46b-12. 
DATED this 13th day of September, 1996. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
^yino 
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POSTAGE PREPAID: 
Lori Warner 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
LORI WARNER, * 
* ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
Applicant, * FOR RECONSIDERATION 
vs. * 
MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC. * 
and TIG INSURANCE CO., * Case No. 95-0555 
Defendants. * 
Lori Warner asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to reconsider its prior decision denying 
Ms. Warner's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over Ms. Warner's request for 
reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13 and Rule R568-1-4.0, Utah Administrative 
Code. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Did the Industrial Commission err in concluding that Ms. Warner had failed to establish that 
her work at Merit Medical Systems, Inc. was the legal and medical cause of the injuries for which 
she now seeks workers' compensation benefits. 
DISCUSSION 
In her request for reconsideration, Ms. Warner raises the same issues that the Industrial 
Commission considered in reaching its prior decision in this matter. Having once more reviewed 
the facts of Ms. Warner's claim, the Industrial Commission again concludes that Ms. Warner has 
failed to establish either legal causation or medical causation in her claim for workers' compensation 
benefits. The Industrial Commission therefore reaffirms its prior decision denying Ms. Warner's 
application. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
LORI WARNER 
PAGE 2 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission reaffirms its prior decision in this matter and denies Ms. 
Warner's request for reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
DATED thii&yu& day of May, 1997. 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
DISSENT 
I dissent from the majority's conclusion that Ms. Warner has not established medical 
causation, for the reasons expressed in my dissent from the Indi^tl^al Commission's previous 
decision in this matter. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review 
with that court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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§ 5—116. [Scope of Review; Grounds for Invalidity]. 
(a) Except to the extent that this Act or another statute provides otherwise: 
(1) The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the 
party asserting invalidity; and 
(2) The validity of agency action must be determined in accordance with 
the standards of review provided in this section, as applied to the agency 
action at the time it was taken. 
(b) The court shall make a separate and distinct ruling on each material 
issue on which the court's decision is based. 
(c) The court shall grant relief only if it determines that a person seeking 
judicial relief has been substantially prejudiced by any one or more of the 
following: 
(1) The agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is 
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied. 
(2) The agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any provi-
sion of law. 
(3) The agency has not decided all issues requiring resolution. 
(4) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law. 
(5) The agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making 
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure. 
(6) The persons taking the agency action were improperly constituted as 
a decision-making body, motivated by an improper purpose, or subject to 
disqualification. 
(7) The agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by evidence that is substantial 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court, which includes 
the agency record for judicial review, supplemented by any additional 
evidence received by the court under this Act. 
(8) The agency action is: 
(i) outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by any 
provision of law; 
(ii) agency action, other than a rule, that is inconsistent with a rule of 
the agency; [or] 
(iii) agency action, other than a rule, that is inconsistent with the 
agency's prior practice unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by 
stating facts and reasons to demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency. [; or] [.] 
(iv) [otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.] 
COMMENT 
The 1961 Revised Model Act prescribed tested cases, Section 15(g), no standards 
standards for the judicial review of con- for the judicial review of rules, Section 7, 
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and no mention of judicial review of 
agency action other than rules or orders. 
This Act, having established a single from 
of action for judicial review of all types of 
agency action in Section 5-105, prescribes 
a single set of standards for judicial re-
view in Section 5-116. This section is 
adapted, with considerable changes, from 
Florida Act, Section 120.68 and Wisconsin 
Act, Section 227.20, which are discussed 
with approval in Brodie & Linde, State 
Court Review of Administrative Action: 
Prescribing the Scope of Review, 1977 
Ariz.St.LJ. 537. 
The standards for judicial review in this 
section reflect the well-accepted principle 
that the role of the reviewing court is, in 
general, a limited one. The limited scope 
of judicial review provided in this section 
may be superseded by another statute, 
which could either preclude judicial re-
view entirely (an approach that might 
raise constitutional questions), or estab-
lish review based on different standards 
than those of this Act. Further, in some 
states, the courts have established a con-
stitutional right to de novo judicial review 
of certain matters in certain types of cir-
cumstances; see, e.g., Strumsky v. San 
Diego Employees Retirement Assn., 11 
Cal.3d 28, 520 P.2d 29 (1974), noted in 63 
Calif.L.Rev. 27 (1975), 26 Hastings L.J. 
1465 (1975). This Act includes some spe-
cial provisions on the scope of judicial 
review of agency action in specified cir-
cumstances—Section 3-109(b) (review of 
interpretative rules); Section 3-204(d)(5) 
(review of rule after the administrative 
rules committee has filed an objection); 
and Section 5-111(d) (review of agency 
action on an application for stay or other 
temporary remedies, unless the agency 
has found its action necessary to protect 
against a substantial threat to the public 
health, safety, or welfare.) In addition, 
this Act includes special adaptations of 
the Section 5-116 standards of review in 
Sections 5-202(c) and 5-203 (civil en-
forcement). 
Subsection (a) places the burden of 
demonstrating the invalidity of agency ac-
tion upon the party who asserts invalidi-
ty. This subsection also emphasizes that 
the focus of the reviewing court's inquiry 
must be the agency action at the time it 
was taken, and not at the time of judicial 
review. 
Subsection (c) requires the person seek-
ing judicial relief to demonstrate substan-
tial prejudice in order to be entitled to 
relief. This prejudice must, moreover, 
arise from one or more of the grounds 
listed in the paragraphs under this subsec-
tion. 
Paragraph (c)(3), providing for judicial 
relief if the agency has not decided all 
issues requiring resolution, deals with the 
possibility that the reviewing court may 
dispose of the case on the basis of issues 
that were not considered by the agency. 
An example would arise if the court had 
to decide on the facial constitutionality of 
the agency's enabling statute, in a state 
where agencies are precluded from pass-
ing on such questions; see Section 5-
112(1). This provision is not intended to 
authorize the reviewing court to initially 
decide issues that are within the agency's 
primary jurisdiction; such issues should 
first be decided by the agency, subject to 
the limited judicial review provided by 
this Act. 
Paragraph (c)(4) includes two distinct 
matters—interpretation and application 
of the law. With regard to the agency's 
interpretation to the law, courts generally 
give little deference to the agency, with 
the result that a court may decide that the 
agency has erroneously interpreted the 
law if the court merely disagrees with the 
agency's interpretation. By contrast, with 
regard to the agency's application of the 
law to specific situations, the enabling 
statute normally confers some discretion 
upon the agency. Accordingly, a court 
should find reversible error in the agen-
cy's application of the law only if the 
agency has improperly exercised its dis-
cretion, within the framework of para-
graph (c)(8). 
One example of an agency's failure to 
follow prescribed procedure, under para-
graph (c)(5), is the agency's failure to act 
within the prescribed time upon a matter 
submitted to the agency. Relief in such 
cases is available under Section 5-117(b) 
and (c). 
Paragraph (c)(7) establishes the "sub-
stantial evidence on the whole record" 
test for judicial review of determinations 
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of fact that are made or implied by the 
agency. In applying this test, the perti-
nent record is the whole record that is 
before the court, which includes not only 
the agency record, but also any additional 
evidence received by the court in accord-
ance with Section 5-114. Thus, if the 
agency action under review is an order 
resulting from a formal or conference 
adjudicative hearing, and if no circum-
stances exist to justify the receipt of any 
additional evidence by the reviewing 
court beyond that contained in the agency 
record, the substantial evidence test will 
be applied to the agency record since in 
this situation the agency record is the 
"whole record before the court." By con-
trast, if the agency action under review is 
a rule, or an order issued pursuant to 
emergency or summary adjudicative pro-
ceedings, and if a determination of the 
validity of the agency action requires res-
olution of a factual dispute, the court may 
take new evidence under Section 5-
114(a)(3), and the "whole record before 
the court" will then consist of a combina-
tion of the agency record plus the new 
evidence taken by the court. The 1961 
Revised Model Act, Section 15(g)(5), dealt 
with judicial review of factual questions 
only with regard to the review of contest-
ed cases. For those purposes, the 1961 
Revised Model Act used the "clearly erro-
neous" test. This Act opts for the "sub-
stantial evidence" test, which was used in 
the 1946 Model Act, Section 12(7)(e), and 
is used in the Federal Act, Section 
706(2)(E), and an increasing number of 
states, either by express statutory lan-
guage or by judicial interpretation; see B. 
Schwartz, Administrative Law Section 214 
(1976). Professor Schwartz also ob-
serves: "Substantial evidence is such evi-
dence as might lead a reasonable person 
to make a finding. The evidence in sup-
port of a fact-finding is substantial when 
from it an inference of existence of the 
fact may be drawn reasonably. In such a 
case, the reviewing court must uphold the 
finding, even if it would have drawn a 
contrary inference from the evidence." 
Id., Section 210, at p. 595. 
Paragraph (c)(8) is related, to some ex-
tent, to the formula found in the 1961 
Revised Model Act Section 15(g)(6)—"ar-
bitrary or capricious or characterized by 
abuse of discretion or clearly unwarrant-
ed exercise of discretion." This Act offers 
two options, depending on whether or not 
bracketed subparagraph (iv) is adopted as 
part of paragraph (c)(8). 
Without the bracketed language, this 
paragraph provides a more limited judi-
cial role than the 1961 Model Act. The 
intent of this limitation is to discourage 
reviewing courts from substituting their 
judgment for that of the agency as to the 
wisdom or desirability of the agency ac-
tion under review. 
With inclusion of the bracketed lan-
guage, this paragraph authorizes judicial 
relief if the agency action is "otherwise 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious." 
This language is approximately although 
not precisely the same as that of the 1961 
Model Act. Cases decided under the 1961 
Model Act are likely to be utilized, at least 
to some extent, as interpretations of this 
bracketed language of the 1981 Act, al-
though the introduction of the term "un-
reasonable" in the bracketed language of 
the 1981 Act may provide judicial oppor-
tunities for interpretations that differ 
from precedents decided under the 1961 
Model Act. 
Note that subparagraph (iii) of (c)(8), 
providing for judicial relief if the chal-
lenged agency action is inconsistent with 
the agency's prior practice, is related to 
Section 2-102, requiring agencies to pre-
pare an index of their written final orders 
and to make this index and the orders 
available for public inspection and copy-
ing. A party may invoke the indexing 
and public access requirements of Section 
2-102, for the purpose of ascertaining the 
agency's prior practice, so as to reveal 
any inconsistency between the challenged 
agency action and prior agency practice. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Judicial review of rulemaking under Texas 
administrative procedure and Texas Register 
Act. John J. Watkins and Debora S. Beck. 34 
Baylor L.Rev. 1 (1982). 
Survey of Kansas law: Administrative law. 
Steve L. Leben. 37 U.Kansas L.Rev. 679 
(1989). 
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Notes of Decisions 
Generally 1 
Deference to agency interpretation of rules 
2 
Substitution of court's judgment for that of 
agency 3 
1. Generally 
Administrative Procedure Act establishes 
scope of review of Utilities and Transportation 
Commission actions upon applications for mo-
tor carrier permits. Inland Empire Distribu-
tion Systems, Inc. v. Utilities and Transp. 
Com'n, 1989, 770 P.2d 624, 112 Wash.2d 278. 
Even though superior court has broader au-
thority to review administrative decisions in 
special action than under ordinary certiorari, 
its primary purpose is to determine whether 
administrative decision was arbitrary, capri-
cious, or abuse of discretion. Blake v. City of 
Phoenix, App.1988, 754 P.2d 1368, 157 Ariz. 93. 
2. Deference to agency interpretation of 
rules 
In reviewing administrative decisions by 
state agencies, deference is given to agency's 
interpretation of its own regulations; however, 
such deference is not total and agency's inter-
pretation must be examined to determine if it 
is consistent with language of regulation and 
with purpose which the regulation is intended 
to serve. In re David B., 1986, 508 A.2d 1045, 
127 N.H. 772. 
In reviewing administrative agency's deci-
sion in petition for certiorari, agency's inter-
pretation of its regulations is to be accorded 
great deference. Petition of Pelletier, 1984, 
484 A.2d 1119, 125 N.H. 565. 
Administrative agency's construction of a 
statute is question of law reviewed de novo 
under error of law standard with heightened 
degree of deference given to administrative 
agency's interpretation when statute is within 
agency's field of expertise. Inland Empire Dis-
tribution Systems, Inc. v. Utilities and Transp. 
Com'n, 1989, 770 P.2d 624, 112 Wash.2d 278. 
3. Substitution of court's judgment for that 
of agency 
Administrative rule may be declared invalid 
only if it violates Constitution or statute or was 
adopted without compliance with statutory 
procedures; consequently, court will not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of an agency nor 
will it examine record for substantial evidence 
in reviewing declaratory judgment on validity 
of rule. American Network, Inc. v. Washing-
ton Utilities and Transp. Com'n, 1989, 776 P.2d 
950, 113 Wash.2d 59. 
Reviewing court properly refused to substi-
tute its judgment for that of fact-finding tribu-
nal where accusations concerning employee's 
misconduct were subject of hotly disputed evi-
dence at administrative hearing, with substan-
tial evidence supporting positions of both em-
ployee and employer. Zavala v. Arizona State 
Personnel Bd., App.1987, 766 P.2d 608, 159 
Ariz. 256. 
Under "error of law" standard, Appellate 
Court may substitute its determination for that 
of agency although agency's determination is 
entitled to substantial weight. Montell v. State, 
Dept. of Social and Health Services, 1989, 775 
P.2d 976, 54 Wash.App. 708. 
§ 5 - 1 1 7 . [Type of Relief]. 
(a) The court may award damages or compensation only to the extent 
expressly authorized by another provision of law. 
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